What Our Choices Say About Our Preferences? by Grining, Krzysztof et al.
What Our Choices Say About Our Preferences?
Krzysztof Grining, Marek Klonowski, Małgorzata Sulkowska
Department of Fundamentals of Computer Science
Faculty of Fundamental Problems of Technology
Wrocław University of Science and Technology
{firstname.secondname}@pwr.edu.pl
Abstract. Taking online decisions is a part of everyday life. Think of buying a
house, parking a car or taking part in an auction. We often take those decisions
publicly, which may breach our privacy - a party observing our choices may
learn a lot about our preferences. In this paper we investigate online stopping
algorithms from privacy preserving perspective, using mathematically rigorous
differential privacy notion.
In differentially private algorithms there is always an issue of balancing the pri-
vacy and utility. In this regime, in most cases, having both optimality and high
level of privacy at the same time is impossible. We propose a mechanism to
achieve a controllable trade-off, quantified by a parameter, between the accuracy
of the online algorithm and its privacy. Depending on the parameter, our mech-
anism can be optimal with weaker differential privacy or suboptimal, yet more
privacy-preserving. We conduct a detailed accuracy and privacy analysis of our
mechanism applied to the optimal algorithm for the classical secretary problem.
Thereby we make a fusion of two canonical models from two different research
areas - optimal stopping and differential privacy.
Key words: privacy preserving algorithm, optimal stopping, differential privacy,
secretary problem
1 Introduction
We make online decisions every day - searching for a flat, trading stock options or park-
ing a car. The choices that we make are mostly based on our knowledge and experience.
Those decisions are most often publicly visible and it raises concern about the internal
information on which the choice was based. It is easy to see that our choices may some-
what leak that information, which we consider as sensitive. Someone could observe our
choices and deduce our preferences or domain knowledge of our algorithmic trading
company. In this paper we consider the security of such information in case of optimal
stopping algorithms.
Optimal stopping algorithms are well known and thoroughly researched. One of the
most fundamental models of such stochastic online decision making is the secretary
problem. We have a set of n candidates and would like to choose the best candidate
from that set. The caveat is that the candidates appear online one by one, i.e., we cannot
see all of them in advance and then make the decision. We have only one choice and we
have to make it online. The decision must be based on incomplete knowledge gathered
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2by comparing current candidate with previously seen ones, and it is irreversible, as the
candidate cannot be hired after he or she is rejected. There is known, optimal solution to
that problem which gives asymptotic probability of 1e for choosing the best candidate.
In this paper we consider optimal stopping algorithms from privacy-protection and
information hiding perspective. Having in mind a realistic interpretation of stopping al-
gorithm, information about the choice we made is published. Intuitively, this leaks some
information about our preferences. If the choice was possible offline, i.e., we could first
see all candidates and then pick the best one, the leakage would be unavoidable, as the
chosen candidate would simply be the best one. See that in case of optimal stopping
algorithms, we deal with online regime. Namely, the candidates are being picked and
rejected on the fly, without possibility to revisit and choose previously seen candidate.
Because of that, the stopping algorithms are not perfectly accurate. Is this inherent un-
certainty enough to sufficiently hide our preferences? Note that the optimal stopping
algorithms can be used for example in algorithmic trading. One might care whether the
visible action on the market (e.g., closing an American option position) leaks something
about internal knowledge.
We base our analysis on differential privacy notion commonly considered as the
only state-of-the-art approach. Differential privacy is mathematically rigorous and for-
mally provable in contrary to previous anonymity-derived privacy definitions. This ap-
proach to privacy-preserving protocols can be used to give formal guarantee for privacy
resilient to any form of post-processing. For survey about differential privacy proper-
ties see [1] and references therein. Analysis of protocols based on differential privacy
is usually technically much more involved comparing with previous approaches, but by
using it we are immune against various linkage attacks (see for example [2,3]).
Informally, the idea behind differential privacy is as follows: for two "similar" in-
puts, a differentially private mechanism should provide a response chosen from very
similar distributions. In effect, judging by the output of the mechanism one cannot say
if a given individual was taken into account for producing a given output, as it cannot
distinguish two outputs produced from two data sets differing with one user. This is
mostly done by adding auxilliary randomness (e.g., adding carefully calibrated noise to
the data).
One may ask if the optimal algorithm in the secretary problem setting is already
private by design. Note that the problem we are facing might, at the first glance, resem-
ble the differentially private auction problem (see [4]). Note however, that here we do
not have scores, the preferences are given by the permutation and they are only com-
parable, not quantifiable, so the exponential mechanism cannot be used. Moreover, due
to the online nature of the problem, we cannot have full knowledge during the whole
procedure. We also have to define metrics of similarity for inputs.
While making online decision we have two extremes - one is to act according to
known, optimal algorithm and the other is to act completely randomly. Obviously, the
first approach will yield the best possible chance to make a correct pick, and the latter
will probably be at most mediocre. On the other hand, optimal algorithm will leak
much more internal information than completely random choice which does not leak
anything by design. Depending on the nature of the problem and the importance of the
information to be hidden we have to make a trade-off.
What Our Choices Say About Our Preferences? 3
In our paper we present an algorithm that is such a trade-off and have a steering
parameter p ∈ [0, 1] (p = 1 - optimal, p = 0 - perfectly hidden preferences). Speaking
more formally, we join two well-known, already canonical models of optimal stopping
time and differential privacy. We provide a very precise analysis of the classical optimal
stopping time from the perspective of preserving privacy. Despite the simplicity of the
algorithm, it was surprisingly complex in analysis from privacy perspective. We also
propose various metrics of input similarity. It turns out that the optimal algorithm has
some privacy, but only in rather weak metrics. Moreover, we propose a suboptimal
algorithm with better privacy parameters and a way to quantify the privacy vs accuracy
trade-off. We also present some negative results in stronger metrics, even for suboptimal
solutions. Our work can be seen as the first step to tackle privacy and information hiding
in optimal stopping algorithms so we focused mostly on classical results and models.
1.1 Main results
The results of our paper are as follows.
• We propose a mechanism transforming any optimal stopping time for linearly or-
dered set of candidates into algorithm preserving accuracy at controllable level and
having better information hiding properties. Formulation of the algorithm is pre-
sented in Section 3. General results concerning its accuracy and differential privacy
are stated in Section 3.1 (see Fact 5 and theorems 1 and 2).
• We conduct a detailed analysis of our mechanism applied to the optimal stopping
algorithm for the classical secretary problem. Results on its accuracy and differen-
tial privacy are stated in Section 3.2 (see Fact 6 and Theorem 3). In particular, we
obtain privacy properties of the optimal algorithm for the secretary problem.
In order to obtain privacy results for our mechanism we had to prove a series of collat-
eral properties of the optimal algorithm for the secretary problem (see Appendix).
2 Formal model
2.1 Stopping time
Let C = {C1, C2, . . . , Cn} be the set of n candidates. Let Sn be the set of all permuta-
tions of elements from C, |Sn| = n!. We interpret a single permutation σ from Sn as the
ordering of candidates with respect to their qualifications, i.e. σ = (σ1, σ2, . . . , σn) =
(Ci1 , Ci2 , . . . , Cin) refers to the ordering Ci1 > Ci2 > . . . > Cin (in particular, it
means that the candidate Ci1 has the best and the candidate Cin has the worst qualifi-
cations from the whole group C). These orderings are called qualification orderings.
Let Tn be also the set of all permutations of elements from C, just this time we
interpret τ ∈ Tn as the sequence giving the order in which candidates appear in some
online game (τ = (τ1, τ2, . . . , τn) means, in particular, that the candidate τ1 appeared
as the first one and the candidate τn as the last one in our online game). These orderings
are called time orderings.
4Throughout this paper we refer to the following model of online stopping problem.
Fix σ (choose a particular qualification ordering on the set of candidates). Note that, in
fact, σ is the set of our preferences, which we want to hide. Assume that τ is chosen
uniformly at random from Tn. The player knows σ but he does not know τ . Candidates
from C appear one by one following the order given by τ . At time t, i.e., when t candi-
dates appeared, the player observes the qualification order induced by {τ1, τ2, . . . , τt}.
That is, he knows the relative ranks of the candidates seen so far but he does not know
their total ranks. At each time step he has to decide whether to continue the game and
reveal the next element or to stop the game meaning that he selects element τt. If he
decides to reveal another element, he is not allowed to come back to the previous steps
of the game. His task is to maximize (or ensure relatively high) probability that the se-
lected candidate belongs to some previously defined set (e.g. is maximal in the whole
set C).
Formally, we define a probability space (Tn,P,P), where P is the set of all subsets
of Tn and the probability measure is defined by P[{τ}] = 1/n! for any τ ∈ Tn.
Definition 1 A stopping time is a function
M : Sn × Tn → {1, 2, . . . , n}
such that its value, say t = M(σ, τ), depends only on information the player gathered
up to time t, which is the qualification order induced by {τ1, τ2, . . . , τt}. The value can
not depend on any future events.
The expression M(σ, τ) = t means that the algorithm M stopped at time t, thus se-
lected the candidate τt. Notation for the candidate returned byM while playing on time
ordering τ is τM(σ,τ). We will often refer to the probability that a candidate returned by
M belongs to some subset S of the set of all candidates C, i.e. P[τM(σ,τ) ∈ S]. In order
to shorten and clarify notation we introduce a notion CM(σ, τ) for τM(σ,τ).
Definition 2 LetM denote the set of all stopping times. We say thatMopt is an optimal
stopping time if
Mopt = argmaxM∈MP[τM ∈ D],
where D ⊆ C is a set of previously defined candidates and τ is chosen uniformly at
random from Tn.
The set {1, 2, . . . , n} will be denoted by [n]. We write f(n) ∼ g(n) whenever
limn→∞ f(n)/g(n) = 1.
2.2 Secretary problem
From now on M∗ will always denote the optimal stopping algorithm for the classical
secretary problem. In the secretary problem the player aims at maximizing the prob-
ability of selecting the candidate which is the best from the whole C. That is, for a
particular σ ∈ Sn, the set D from Definition 2 is given by D = {σ1}. A full solution
to this problem is well known, consult [5] or [6]. Both, the optimal algorithm itself and
its probability of success are given exactly. The asymptotic results are also established.
We present them below.
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Definition 3 Let σ ∈ Sn be the qualification ordering of elements from C. Let the value
tn be so-called threshold of the algorithm. The optimal algorithm M∗ for the secretary
problem (the one maximizing P[τM = σ1] over M ∈M) is defined as follows. For any
τ ∈ Tn we have M∗(σ, τ) = k if and only if
(1) k > tn − 1 and
(2) τk is the maximal element in the qualification ordering induced by {τ1, τ2, . . . , τk}
and
(3) for i ∈ {tn, . . . , k − 1} the element τi is not maximal in the qualification ordering
induced by {τ1, . . . , τi}.
If τ is such that the above three conditions are never altogether satisfied, thenM∗(σ, τ) =
n.
Fact 1 The threshold tn of the optimal algorithm M∗ for the classical secretary prob-
lem with n candidates is defined as the smallest integer t for which
1
t
+
1
t+ 1
+ . . .+
1
n− 1 6 1.
We have tn ∼ n/e (consult [5]).
Fact 2 Fix σ ∈ Sn. The probability that the optimal algorithm M∗ selects the kth best
candidate is given by
P[CM∗(σ, τ) = σk] =
tn − 1
n
(
n−k+1∑
i=tn
(
n−k
i−1
)(
n−1
i−1
) 1
i− 1 +
1
n− 1
)
,
where tn is the threshold from Fact 1 (consult [7] or see Theorem 4 in Appendix). In
particular, the probability that it wins (selects the best candidate) is
P[CM∗(σ, τ) = σ1] =
tn − 1
n
n∑
i=tn
1
i− 1 ∼ 1/e ≈ 0.37.
In general, when k is a constant or a function of n such that k(n) = o(n)
P[CM∗(σ, τ) = σk] ∼ 1
e
∞∑
s=k
1
s
(
1− 1
e
)s
(consult Theorem 5 in Appendix).
2.3 Differential privacy
In this subsection we recall differential privacy definition and present the privacy model
used throughout this paper. For more details about differential privacy itself see for
example [1]. A privacy mechanism is a randomized algorithm used by the curator that
takes as input a database, and produces the output (the release) using randomization.
6We assume that there exists a trusted curator who holds, or securely obtains, data of
individuals in database x. Let the number of rows be N . Every row consists of the
data of some individual. By X we denote the space of all possible rows. The goal is to
protect the data of every single individual, even if all users except one collude with the
Adversary to breach privacy of this single, uncorrupted user.
Definition 4 (Differential Privacy, [1]) A randomized algorithmM with domainN|X |
is (ε, δ)-differentially private, if for all S ⊆ Range(M ) and for all x, y ∈ N|X | such that
‖x− y‖1 6 1 the following condition is satisfied:
P[M(x) ∈ S] 6 eε · P[M(y) ∈ S] + δ,
where the probability space is over the outcomes of M and ‖·‖1 denotes standard l1
norm.
The intuition of (ε, δ)-differential privacy is as follows: if we choose two consec-
utive databases (that differ exactly on one record), then the mechanism is very likely
to return indistinguishable values. Speaking informally, it preserves privacy with high
probability, but the outcome could be distinguishable, thus not privacy-preserving, with
probability at most δ.
In this paper we consider optimal stopping algorithms, so by the database we un-
derstand the permutation of the set of n choices (e.g. candidates in secretary problem).
In other words, rather than hiding the participation of a candidate, we would rather hide
preferences. Indeed it is the preference that is sensitive, not the participation itself. For
example, in financial markets the set of candidates is publicly known (say, prices of
a stock). On the other hand, our reaction to that set based on the underlying assump-
tions and domain knowledge, which are connected with the preferences permutation is
sensitive and needs protection.
Below we present the differential privacy definition reformulated for our purposes.
Definition 5 Let (Sn, d) be a metric space. We say that a randomized algorithm M is
an (ε, δ)-differentially private stopping time w.r.t. metrics d if for all S ⊆ Range(M )
and for all σ, ρ ∈ Sn such that d(σ, ρ) 6 1 we have
P[CM(σ, τ) ∈ S] 6 eεP[CM(ρ, τ) ∈ S] + δ,
where τ is chosen uniformly at random from Tn.
Throughout this paper we always assume a uniform distribution on Tn. Therefore
all probabilities are calculated with respect to the fact that τ is chosen uniformly at
random from Tn.
We introduce the definition of parametrized metrics on Sn.
Definition 6 For l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n− 1} let dl : Sn ×Sn → [0,∞). We say that dl is an
l-distance between permutations σ, ρ ∈ Sn if
dl(σ, ρ) = min{k : σ = pi1 ◦ pi2 ◦ . . . ◦ pik ◦ ρ},
where pii ∈ Sn and each pii is a transposition of elements being at least l apart in
permutation pii+1 ◦ . . . ◦ pik ◦ ρ.
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Example 1 Let σ = (C1, C2, C3, . . . , Cn−1, Cn) and ρ = (Cn, C2, C3, . . . , Cn−1, C1).
We have d1(σ, ρ) = n − 1 since we need to make at least n − 1 swaps of neighboring
elements in order to obtain σ from ρ:
σ = (C1 C2) ◦ (C1 C3) ◦ . . . ◦ (C1 Cn) ◦ ρ.
However, dn−1(σ, ρ) = 1 since we need just one swap of elements n− 1 apart in order
to obtain σ from ρ:
σ = (C1 Cn) ◦ ρ.
Fact 3 Let l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n− 1}. It is easy to show that (Sn, dl) is a metric space.
See that the strongest metric from those mentioned here is dn−1, as it treats two
permutations with a pair of swapped elements as neighboring. On the other hand, d1
is the weakest as only those that swap two neighboring elements (e.g. first and sec-
ond) are considered neighboring permutations. Note that, from the privacy perspective,
these metrics significantly differ. The strongest metric, intuitively, hides our preferences
completely, as for given candidate we have similar output even if we changed his or her
preference to be last or first. See that if an algorithm is private in strongest metric, that
would mean the adversary cannot really guess the preferences, even knowing the picked
candidate. Intuitively, it might be hard to achieve, as that would mean the final choice
says almost nothing about preferences. In general, dl metric hides preferences for up
to l distance. In other words, say that a picked candidate was in reality k-th on the full
preference list. From the Adversary perspective he or she could have been between k−l
and k + l on the preference list.
3 Hiding preferences
Each optimal stopping algorithm is (ε, δ)-differentially private at some level, i.e. for
some values of ε and δ. Of course, these values will be often too high to meet user’s
expectations. What user can do is to resign from the optimality of the algorithm (how-
ever try to keep the accuracy of the algorithm at some acceptable level) gaining higher
level of privacy. It can be achieved by a careful modification of the distribution of the
outcome of the algorithm. Analyzing the definition of differential privacy one can de-
duce that the closer this distribution to the uniform one is, the smaller the values of ε
and δ in the definition of differential privacy may become. E.g., below in Fact 4 we ex-
plain that the algorithm with uniform outcome is (0, 0)-differentially private regardless
of the metrics. Thus what user should do in order to achieve the desired privacy level is
to modify the algorithm Mopt such that the distribution of its outcome comes in some
sense closer to the uniform distribution.
In this section we propose a mechanism transforming an arbitrary optimal stop-
ping timeMopt into the algorithm meeting stricter privacy requirements, yet preserving
some level of accuracy. It is equipped with a parameter p ∈ [0, 1] controlling the smooth
transition between optimality and information hiding.
Definition 7 Let Mopt be some optimal stopping algorithm and M ′ be the stopping
algorithm for the same problem. A p-mix on Mopt and M ′ is the algorithm defined as
8follows. Toss a coin that comes down heads with probability p. If it comes down heads,
play according to Mopt. If it comes down tails, play according to M ′.
Definition 8 We call the algorithm M˜ a blind choice if for a fixed σ ∈ Sn and for any
τ ∈ Tn it always stops at τ1, i.e., CM˜(σ, τ) = τ1, equivalently M˜(σ, τ) = 1.
Fact 4 A blind choice M˜ is (0, 0)-differentially private regardless of the metrics we
use.
Proof. Note that for a fixed σ and any C ∈ C we have P[CM˜(σ, τ) = C] = 1/n.
Indeed, the candidate C will be selected by M˜ if and only if it is the first candidate in
the time ordering τ . Time ordering τ is chosen uniformly at random from Tn, thus the
probability that it starts with C is 1/n. In particular, for S ⊆ C we get P[CM˜(σ, τ) ∈
S] = |S|/n (this probability is independent of σ). Thus for fixed σ, ρ ∈ Sn and for any
S ⊆ C we always get
P[CM˜(σ, τ) ∈ S] = P[CM˜(ρ, τ) ∈ S] = |S|/n
thus
P[CM˜(σ, τ) ∈ S] 6 e0P[CM˜(ρ, τ) ∈ S] + 0.
Note that if we consider a p-mix on Mopt and M˜ (i.e. a p-mix on optimal algorithm
and a blind choice) then what we obtain is a controllable by p algorithm being a trade-
off between two extremes. One of them is optimality (the case when p = 1) and the
other one is (0, 0)-differential privacy (the case when p = 0). Setting higher p means
relaxing the requirements for (ε, δ)-differential privacy but at the same time obtaining
larger probability of choosing the proper candidate. Setting smaller p we resign from
the high accuracy of the algorithm but we gain higher level of privacy.
Some general results on accuracy and privacy of a p-mix algorithm are given in
Section 3.1. The detailed analysis of a very classical case, i.e. of a p-mix on the optimal
algorithm for the secretary problem and a blind choice, is given in Section 3.2.
3.1 Accuracy and differential privacy of a p-mix M
In this section we formulate some general results on accuracy and privacy of a p-mix
algorithm. We start with a simple fact about the minimum level to which accuracy of
this algorithm may drop.
Fact 5 Fix σ ∈ Sn. Let D ⊆ C be the set of desired candidates from Definition 2.
Let Mopt be the optimal stopping time and M ′ any other stopping algorithm for this
problem. Let p ∈ [0, 1] and M be the p-mix on Mopt and M ′. Then
P[CM(σ, τ) ∈ D] > p · P[CMopt(σ, τ) ∈ D].
Proof. Obviously, by the definition of p-mix algorithm we get
P[CM(σ, τ) ∈ D] = p · P[CMopt(σ, τ) ∈ D] + (1− p) · P[CM ′(σ, τ) ∈ D]
> p · P[CMopt(σ, τ) ∈ D].
What Our Choices Say About Our Preferences? 9
Assume that the optimal algorithm for some stopping problem is (ε, δ) - differen-
tially private. The following theorems explain how differential privacy improves (i.e.,
how parameters ε and δ drop) if we mix this optimal algorithm with algorithm whose
outcome distribution is in some sense close to the uniform one. Note, in particular,
that M ′ with uniform outcome distribution satisfies the assumption of theorems for any
ε > 0.
Theorem 1. Fix σ ∈ Sn. Let Mopt be some optimal stopping algorithm. Consider a
metric space (Sn, dl). Assume that Mopt is (ε, δ)-differentially private w.r.t. metrics dl.
Let M ′ be the algorithm whose outcome distribution satisfies the following condition.
For all k,m ∈ [n] such that |k −m| 6 l let
P[CM ′(σ, τ) = σk] 6 eε · P[CM ′(σ, τ) = σm].
Then the p-mix M on Mopt and M ′ is (ε, p · δ)-differentially private w.r.t. metrics dl.
Proof. The algorithm Mopt is (ε, δ)-differentially private w.r.t. metrics dl thus for all
ρ ∈ Sn such that dl(σ, ρ) 6 1 and for all S ⊆ C we have
P[CMopt(σ, τ) ∈ S] 6 eεP[CMopt(ρ, τ) ∈ S] + δ.
Moreover, by the definition of p-mix for every pi ∈ Sn we get
P[CM(pi, τ) ∈ S] = p · P[CMopt(pi, τ) ∈ S] + (1− p) · P[CM ′(pi, τ) ∈ S].
Hence for all ρ ∈ Sn such that dl(σ, ρ) 6 1 and for all S ⊆ C
P[CM(σ, τ) ∈ S] = p · P[CMopt(σ, τ) ∈ S] + (1− p) · P[CM ′(σ, τ) ∈ S]
6 p · eε · P[CMopt(ρ, τ) ∈ S] + p · δ + (1− p) · P[CM ′(σ, τ) ∈ S]
= eε(P[CM(ρ, τ) ∈ S]− (1− p) · P[CM ′(ρ, τ) ∈ S])
+ p · δ + (1− p) · P[CM ′(σ, τ) ∈ S]
= eεP[CM(ρ, τ) ∈ S] + p · δ
− (1− p)(eεP[CM ′(ρ, τ) ∈ S]− P[CM ′(σ, τ) ∈ S]).
(1)
Since dl(σ, ρ) 6 1 we can write that σ = (σ1, . . . , σk, . . . , σk+j , . . . , σn) and ρ =
(σk σk+j) ◦σ = (σ1, . . . , σk−1, σk+j , σk+2, . . . , σk, . . . , σn), where j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l}.
For any pi ∈ Sn we have P[CM ′(pi, τ) ∈ S] =
∑
s∈S P[CM ′(pi, τ) = s]. Note that
whenever S is such that σk, σk+j ∈ S or σk, σk+j /∈ S then P[CM ′(ρ, τ) ∈ S] =
P[CM ′(σ, τ) ∈ S] and (1) reduces to
P[CM(σ, τ) ∈ S] 6 eεP[CM(ρ, τ) ∈ S] + p · δ − (1− p)(eε − 1)P[CM ′(ρ, τ) ∈ S]
6 eεP[CM(ρ, τ) ∈ S] + p · δ.
Thus assume that σk ∈ S and σk+j /∈ S (the remaining case when σk+j ∈ S
and σk /∈ S is analogous). For i ∈ [n] denote qi,n = P[CM ′(σ, τ) = σi] and q =
P[CM ′(σ, τ) ∈ S \ {σk}]. We have
P[CM ′(σ, τ) ∈ S] = qk,n + q and P[CM ′(ρ, τ) ∈ S] = qk+j,n + q.
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By the assumption on the outcome distribution of M ′ we get eεqk+j,n > qk,n, hence
eεP[CM ′(ρ, τ) ∈ S]− P[CM ′(σ, τ) ∈ S] = q(eε − 1) + eεqk+j,n − qk,n > 0.
By (1) we obtain again P[CM(σ, τ) ∈ S] 6 eεP[CM(ρ, τ) ∈ S] + p · δ thus we
conclude that p-mix M is (ε, p · δ) - differentially private.
Theorem 2. Fix σ ∈ Sn. Let Mopt be some optimal stopping algorithm. Consider a
metric space (Sn, dl). Assume that Mopt is (ε, δ)-differentially private w.r.t. metrics dl.
Let M ′ be the algorithm whose outcome distribution satisfies the following condition.
For all k,m ∈ [n] such that |k −m| 6 l let
P[CM ′(σ, τ) = σk] 6 eε · P[CM ′(σ, τ) = σm].
Then, if only p ≥ 1 − eε−1δ , the p-mix M on Mopt and M ′ is (ln(eε − (1 − p)δ), δ)-
differentially private w.r.t. metrics dl.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 1.
3.2 Trade-off between optimality and differential privacy in the secretary
problem
This section is an analytical discussion about the optimal stopping algorithm for the
classical secretary problem in the context of differential privacy. Below we present a
detailed analysis of accuracy and differential privacy of a p-mix on M∗ and M˜ , where
M∗ is the optimal solution for the secretary problem, and M˜ is the blind choice. Recall
that in the secretary problem one aims at choosing only the best out of all n candidates
(i.e., for a fixed σ ∈ Sn at selecting σ1). Any other choice is interpreted as loss. Let us
start with a simple fact about the accuracy of p-mix on M∗ and M˜ .
Fact 6 Fix σ ∈ Sn. Let M be a p-mix on M∗ and M˜ , where M∗ is the optimal algo-
rithm for the secretary problem, and M˜ is the blind choice. Then
P[CM(σ, τ) = σ1] = p · P[CM∗(σ, τ) = σ1] + 1− p
n
∼ p
e
.
Proof. The result follows straight from the definition of p-mix and Fact 2.
Before we move on to analyzing differential privacy of the classical p-mix on M∗
and M˜ , let us introduce some simplifications in notation. Throughout this section p ∈
[0, 1] is always a constant and M is always a p-mix on M∗ and M˜ . (The case p = 0
when M is just a blind choice was already discussed thus we will often assume p ∈
(0, 1].) We also introduce shorter notation for probabilities thatM∗ orM select kth best
candidate, namely for σ ∈ Sn
rk,n = P[CM∗(σ, τ) = σk] and qk,n = P[CM(σ, τ) = σk].
By this notation, following Definition 7, we can write
qk,n = p · rk,n + 1− p
n
. (2)
Therefore, by Theorem 5 (see Appendix), we formulate the following corollary.
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Corollary 1. Let σ ∈ Sn, let p ∈ [0, 1] be a constant and let M be a p-mix on M∗ and
M˜ . Then for k > 1 being a constant or a function of n such that k(n) = o(n)
qk,n ∼ p
e
·
∞∑
s=k
1
s
(
1− 1
e
)s
, in particular q1,n ∼ p
e
.
For transparency of notation let also
ak =
∞∑
s=k
1
s
(
1− 1
e
)s
.
Note that the above sum always converges, in particular a1 = 1 and a2 = 1/e. By Fact 2
and Corollary 1 for k > 1 being a constant or a function of n such that k(n) = o(n) we
can simply write
rk,n ∼ 1
e
· ak and qk,n ∼ p
e
· ak.
In Theorem 3 and two following corollaries we give constraints for ε, δ and p which
guarantee that a p-mixM is (ε, δ)-differentially private with respect to metrics dl. How-
ever, those considerations we start with the lemma showing that for given p and δ the
algorithm M is not capable of achieving (ε, δ)-differential privacy with reasonable val-
ues of ε when l is a function of n such that l(n) n→∞−−−−→∞.
Lemma 1. Fix σ ∈ Sn. Consider a metric space (Sn, dl) for l = l(n) n→∞−−−−→ ∞. Let
p ∈ (0, 1] and δ ∈ [0, 1]. The p-mix M is (ε, δ)-differentially private with respect to dl
only if ε n→∞−−−−→∞.
Proof. Consider ρ ∈ Sn such that ρ = (σ1 σl+1)◦σ = (σl+1, σ2, . . . , σl, σ1, σl+2, . . . , σn).
We have dl(σ, ρ) = 1. Consider S = {σ1}. For i ∈ [n] denote P[CM(σ, τ) = σi] =
qi,n. Note that
P[CM(σ, τ) ∈ S] = q1,n and P[CM(ρ, τ) ∈ S] = ql+1,n.
If we want M to be (ε, δ)-differentially private, the following inequality has to be sat-
isfied
eε > P[CM(σ, τ) ∈ S]− δ
P[CM(ρ, τ) ∈ S] . (3)
By (2) and Corollary 1
P[CM(σ, τ) ∈ S]− δ
P[CM(ρ, τ) ∈ S] =
q1,n − δ
ql+1,n
∼ p/e+
1−p
n − δ
p · rl+1,n + 1−pn
.
By Lemma 6 (see Appendix)
lim
n→∞
p/e+ 1−pn − δ
p · rl+1,n + 1−pn
> lim
n→∞
p/e+ 1−pn − δ
p(1− 1/e)l+1 + p/e+1−pn
=∞.
This means that by l n→∞−−−−→ ∞ the p-mix M could be (ε, δ)-differentially private only
if ε n→∞−−−−→∞.
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From now on we assume that l is a constant. The following two technical lemmas
will be helpful by proving the main theorem.
Lemma 2. Fix σ ∈ Sn. The sequence {qk,n}k∈[n] is non-increasing in k.
Proof. By Corollary 4 (see Appendix) we know that the sequence {rk,n}k∈[n] is non-
increasing in k. By (2) we have
qk,n − qk+1,n = p · (rk,n − rk+1,n) > 0.
Lemma 3. Fix σ ∈ Sn. Let l > 1 be a constant. Let δ ∈ [0, 1]. For any k ∈ [n− 1], if
n > 7 then
q1,n − δ
ql+1,n
> qk,n − δ
qk+l,n
.
Proof. First, we are going to show that for k > 2
lim
n→∞
q1,n
ql+1,n
> lim
n→∞
qk,n
qk+l,n
. (4)
By (2) and by Fact 2 we have
lim
n→∞
q1,n
ql+1,n
= lim
n→∞
r1,n
rl+1,n
=
1
al+1
and lim
n→∞
qk,n
qk+l,n
= lim
n→∞
p · rk,n + 1−pn
p · rk+l,n + 1−pn
.
By Theorem 6 (see Appendix) we know that for k > 2 we have limn→∞ rk,nrk+l,n <
1
al+1
.
Thus for sufficiently large n (one can verify that n > 7 is enough) we can write rk,n <
rk+l,n
al+1
and thereby get (note that al+1 < 1)
p · rk,n + 1−pn
p · rk+l,n + 1−pn
<
p · rk+l,nal+1 +
1−p
n
p · rk+l,n + 1−pn
n→∞−−−−→

p· cal+1+1−p
p·c+1−p <
1
al+1
when rk+l,n = c · 1/n+ o(1/n),
1 < 1al+1 when rk+l,n = o(1/n).
Whenever rk+l,n = ω(1/n) we also have rk,n = ω(1/n) (indeed, by Corollary 4 the
sequence rk,n is non-increasing in k) and again by Theorem 6 (see Appendix) we get
lim
n→∞
p · rk,n + 1−pn
p · rk+l,n + 1−pn
= lim
n→∞
rk,n
rk+l,n
<
1
al+1
.
We conclude that for any k ∈ [n − 1] and sufficiently large n (again n > 7 is
enough) we get q1,nql+1,n >
qk,n
qk+l,n
and, by Lemma 2,
q1,n − δ
ql+1,n
=
q1,n
ql+1,n
− δ
ql+1,n
> q1,n
ql+1,n
− δ
qk+l,n
> qk,n
qk+l,n
− δ
qk+l,n
=
qk,n − δ
qk+l,n
.
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Theorem 3. Fix σ ∈ Sn. Consider a metric space (Sn, dl) for l > 1 being a constant.
Let p ∈ (0, 1] and δ ∈ [0, 1]. If n > 7 and
ε >
{
ln
(
q1,n−δ
ql+1,n
)
∼ ln
(
p−δ·e
al+1·p
)
for δ < q1,n − ql+1,n
0 for δ > q1,n − ql+1,n
then the p-mix M is (ε, δ)-differentially private.
Proof. Consider ρ ∈ Sn such that dl(σ, ρ) = 1. Let σ = (σ1, . . . , σk, . . . , σk+j , . . . , σn)
and ρ = (σk σk+j) ◦ σ = (σ1, . . . , σk−1, σk+j , σk+2, . . . , σk, . . . , σn), where j ∈
{1, 2, . . . , l}. For i ∈ [n] denote P[CM(σ, τ) = σi] = qi,n. For i ∈ [n] \ {k, k+ j} we
have
P[CM(ρ, τ) = σi] = P[CM(σ, τ) = σi] = qi,n.
In remaining cases P[CM(ρ, τ) = σk] = qk+j,n and P[CM(ρ, τ) = σk+j ] = qk,n. We
want to find the values of ε for which
P[CM(σ, τ) ∈ S] 6 eεP[CM(ρ, τ) ∈ S] + δ (5)
holds for any S ⊆ C. Equivalently, we will work with the inequality
eε > P[CM(σ, τ) ∈ S]− δ
P[CM(ρ, τ) ∈ S] , (6)
assuming that S 6= ∅. (When S = ∅ the inequality (5) holds with ε > 0.) Thus let us
investigate what is the maximal value that the right-hand side of the inequality (6) may
attain.
Note that whenever S neither contains σk nor σk+j , the probabilities P[CM(σ, τ) ∈
S] and P[CM(ρ, τ) ∈ S] are equal and the above inequality holds with ε > 0. The
situation is analogous whenever S includes both, σk and σk+j . Thus, let us consider S
such that σk ∈ S and σk+j /∈ S (the symmetric case with σk+j ∈ S and σk /∈ S will
be discussed later on). We can write
P[CM(σ, τ) ∈ S] = qk,n + q and P[CM(ρ, τ) ∈ S] = qk+j,n + q,
where q = P[CM(σ, τ) ∈ S \ {σk}] = P[CM(ρ, τ) ∈ S \ {σk}]. For n > 7 we have
P[CM(σ, τ) ∈ S]− δ
P[CM(ρ, τ) ∈ S] =
qk,n + q − δ
qk+j,n + q
6 qk,n + q − δ
qk+l,n + q
= 1 +
qk,n − qk+l,n − δ
qk+l,n + q
6 1 + qk,n − qk+l,n − δ
qk+l,n
=
qk,n − δ
qk+l,n
6 q1,n − δ
ql+1,n
.
The first inequality follows from Lemma 2, while the last one from Lemma 3. Note that
one but last inequality means that we maximize the right-hand side of the inequality
(6) choosing S = {σk} (i.e., setting q = 0). While the last inequality means that we
maximize the right-hand side of the inequality (6) choosing S = {σ1} (i.e., setting
k = 1).
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Now, one can see that when δ > q1,n − ql+1,n, we have q1,n−δql+1,n 6 1 and the
inequality (6) holds with ε > 0. While for δ < q1,n−ql+1,n we conclude that whenever
eε > q1,n − δ
ql+1,n
, equivalently ε > ln
(
q1,n − δ
ql+1,n
)
,
the algorithm M is (ε, δ)-differentially private. Additionally, by Corollary 1 we get
ln
(
q1,n − δ
ql+1,n
)
∼ ln
(
p− δ · e
al+1 · p
)
.
Finally, consider the case when σk+j ∈ S and σk /∈ S. This time
P[CM(σ, τ) ∈ S] = qk+j,n + q and P[CM(ρ, τ) ∈ S] = qk,n + q,
where q = P[CM(σ, τ) ∈ S \ {σk+j}] = P[CM(ρ, τ) ∈ S \ {σk+j}]. And this time
by Lemma 2 we have
P[CM(σ, τ) ∈ S]− δ
P[CM(ρ, τ) ∈ S] =
qk+j,n + q − δ
qk,n + q
6 1
thus the inequality (6) holds with ε > 0.
Figure 1 shows the shape of the asymptotic region of pairs (ε, δ) for which the p-mix
M is (ε, δ)-differentially private. Figure 2 shows how the boundaries of asymptotic
Fig. 1: Shaded area is an asymptotic region in which p-mix M is (ε, δ)-differentially
private.
regions in which p-mix M is (ε, δ)-differentially private change with p for given l.
Figure 3 shows how the boundaries of asymptotic region in which p-mix M is (ε, δ)-
differentially private change with l for given p.
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Fig. 2: Boundaries of asymptotic regions in which p-mix M is (ε, δ)-differentially pri-
vate for given l and various values of p.
Fig. 3: Boundaries of asymptotic regions in which p-mix M is (ε, δ)-differentially pri-
vate for given p and various values of l.
Corollary 2. Fix σ ∈ Sn. Consider a metric space (Sn, dl) for l > 1 being a constant.
Let p ∈ (0, 1] and ε > 0. If n > 7 and
δ >
q1,n − e
εql+1,n ∼ pe (1− al+1eε) for ε < ln
(
q1,n
ql+1,n
)
0 for ε > ln
(
q1,n
ql+1,n
)
then the algorithm M is (ε, δ)-differentially private.
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Proof. Note that the inequality δ > q1,n − eεql+1,n is analogous to the inequality
ε > ln
(
q1,n−δ
ql+1,n
)
from Theorem 3 and by Corollary 1 we get q1,n − eεql+1,n ∼
p
e (1− al+1eε).
Analyzing the above corollary one can easily notice that the results for the secretary
problem coincide with general results from Section 3.1. Indeed, by Corollary 2 for
p = 1 we get that if n ≥ 7 and ε < ln
(
r1,n
rl+1,n
)
then p-mix M (which by p = 1 is
just the optimal algorithm for the secretary problem) is (ε, r1,n−eεrl+1,n)-differentially
private w.r.t. dl. Denote δ˜ = r1,n−eεrl+1,n. By Theorem 1 we get that for any p ∈ (0, 1]
the p-mixM is (ε, p · δ˜) - differentially private. Let’s compare it with the result for any p
obtained in Corollary 2 - here we get that for any p the p-mixM is (ε, p·δ˜− 1−pn (eε−1))
- differentially private. Thus the result from corollary is tighter. The difference comes
from the fact that in this section we work with the blind choice, while Theorem 1 is
formulated for quite wide range of algorithms M ′. Note however that if in the proof
of Theorem 1 we assume that M ′ has a uniform outcome distribution (i.e., is a blind
choice) then in the inequality (1) we obtain
P[CM(ρ, τ) ∈ S] 6 eεP[CM(ρ, τ) ∈ S] + p · δ˜ − |S|(1− p)
n
(eε − 1)
6 eεP[CM(ρ, τ) ∈ S] + p · δ˜ − (1− p)
n
(eε − 1).
which perfectly coincides with the result from Corollary 2. The last inequality follows
from the fact that whenever |S| = 0, the inequality (1) is trivial thus the least S to
consider is of cardinality 1.
Corollary 3. Fix σ ∈ Sn. Consider a metric space (Sn, dl) for l > 1 being a constant.
Let δ ∈ [0, 1] and ε > 0. If n > 7 and
p 6
{
δ+ 1n (e
ε−1)
r1,n−eεrl+1,n+ 1n (eε−1)
∼ e·δ1−eεal+1 for δ < r1,n − eεrl+1,n
1 for δ > r1,n − eεrl+1,n
then the p-mix M is (ε, δ)-differentially private.
Proof. By Corollary 2 we know that for ε > 0 the p-mix M is (ε, δ)-differentially
private if only δ > q1,n − eεql+1,n. By (2) we can rewrite it as
δ > p · r1,n + 1− p
n
− eε
(
p · rl+1,n + 1− p
n
)
which is equivalent to
p 6
δ + 1n (e
ε − 1)
r1,n − eεrl+1,n + 1n (eε − 1)
∼ e · δ
1− eεal+1 ,
where asymptotics follows from Fact 2.
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To sum it up, we present a few explicit examples with parameters we obtained. All
the examples here are w.r.t. metric d1. Note also that we used the asymptotic parameters
from our results. In these examples we used ε = 0.5 and δ = 0.01 and 0.05 as these are
the values commonly used in differential privacy settings. Generally values of ε at most
1 and δ 6 0.05 are considered acceptable. Figure 4 shows the ε parameter for which the
p-mix M is (ε, 0.01)-differentially private. See that in such case the ε does not exceed
1 even for p = 1, so playing only the optimal algorithm.
Fig. 4: Privacy parameter ε of p-mix M for δ = 0.01
Figure 5 shows the δ parameter for which the p-mix M is (0.5, δ)-differentially
private. Note that if we demand δ to be at most 0.05, then p has to be around 0.35.
Fig. 5: Privacy parameter δ of p-mix M for ε = 0.5
Figure 6 shows how small p parameter has to be for p-mix M to obtain (ε, 0.05)-
differential privacy. See that if we accept ε ≈ 0.8 or higher, we have p = 1 and therefore
we are playing with optimal strategy.
To sum up, the parameters in many cases seem to be acceptable. Of course prefer-
ably we would have δ asymptotically converging to 0, but unfortunately, this is not
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Fig. 6: Parameter p of p-mix M for δ = 0.05
happening here. Still, those values that we presented are commonly thought to be good
enough to be used.
4 Previous and Related Work
In this paper we take a new perspective on optimal stopping algorithms. Namely, we
focus on their privacy properties in the sense of differential privacy. The idea of differ-
ential privacy has been introduced in [8], however its precise formulation in the widely
used form appeared in [9]. There is vast amount of research concerning differential pri-
vacy, e.g. [10,11,12]. Most of mentioned papers focus on a centralised model, namely a
database with trusted party holding it. There is a party called curator that is entitled to
gather and see all participants’ data and releases the computed data to wider (possibly
untrusted) audience. Comprehensive introduction to differential privacy can be found
in [1].
There is a recent line of research concerning differential obliviousness, which stem
from the [13] paper and was further explored in, i.a., [14,15]. The authors propose a
notion very similar to differential privacy, yet operating in the obliviousness regime. In-
tuitively, differentially oblivious algorithm gives indistinguishable outputs to two sim-
ilar access patterns. Our line of research can be seen as parallel, we also use known
differential privacy definition. However, instead of obliviousness, we build the model
for hiding the internal information in optimal stopping algorithms.
The origins of the secretary problem are hazy. It is neither obvious who formulated
the problem nor clear who solved it for the first time. What is certain, in 1960 it was
popularized by Martin Gardner in Scientific American column under the name of googol
game and the optimal solution was first written down by Lindley in [5]. For a historical
overview of the secretary problem consult Ferguson’s survey [6]. Many generalizations
of this classical version were considered later on. Stadje was the first one who replaced a
linear order of candidates with the partial order (poset) and aimed at choosing any max-
imal element, [16]. An account of research considering threshold strategies for posets
was given by Gnedin in [17]. Optimal strategies for a particular posets as well as univer-
sal algorithms for the whole families of posets have been featured in [18,19,20,21,22].
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The problem was investigated even on much more general structures, like matroids
(consult [23]). Other interesting extensions consider different payoff functions. A natu-
ral reformulation of the classical case is to aim at minimizing the expected rank of the
candidate instead of at selecting just the best one. This model was introduced by Lind-
ley in [5] but fully solved by Chow et al. in [24]. The full information variant, where the
selector knows the distribution of the random variables to appear as well as their sub-
sequent realizations was introduced and solved by Gilbert and Mosteller in [25]. The
same paper formulates investment problem in terms of stopping model and proposes the
game in which player can make several choices. In [26] the authors present the stop-
ping problem in the auction setting where the seller has a multidimensional objective
function with only a partial order among the outcomes. Even though formulated prob-
ably in the mid-1950s, the secretary problem with its generalizations is still vivid and
attracts the attention of theoretical computer science community, see the latest results
in [27,28].
To the best of our knowledge, optimal stopping algorithms were not considered
from privacy perspective before.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we have investigated optimal stopping algorithms from information hiding
perspective. We have found the privacy guarantees of the optimal secretary problem al-
gorithm. Moreover, we have explained how to improve it by decreasing utility (making
the algorithm suboptimal). We have also shown that the results depend strongly on the
chosen metrics for neighboring inputs, which is not obvious in case of secretary prob-
lem and other such protocols. This work can be seen as the first step in differentially
private optimal stopping algorithms.
Note that we have considered only the classical secretary problem while the optimal
stopping literature offers the whole variety of different models. One could, e.g., analyze
the algorithm that optimizes the expected rank of the candidate (intuitively, we do not
necessarily require the best candidate but at least ’good enough’). It may have better
information hiding properties inherently. One could consider models in which we win
when the selected candidate is say at least top 10. One could consider a full information
model, [25]. One could also work on models with different ordering, e.g. using partially
ordered sets instead of linear order as a qualification ordering. However, in this case it
is unclear whether a reasonable metric for similarity of preferences could be proposed.
Our approach was to keep the final algorithm simple, so we based it on known,
optimal one. Elseways, one might propose an entirely different algorithm, that is not
optimal but has better information hiding properties or is closer to optimal for given
privacy parameters. Note also that essentially we have focused on hiding the informa-
tion about preferences, not the participation of a specific candidate. Another venue of
research could be investigating whether participation hiding is feasible in such circum-
stances. Even if not for all candidates, then maybe at least for the majority of candidates
it could be possible.
We believe that this paper opens an interesting new research area lying at the cross-
roads of online algorithms and differential privacy.
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Appendix
Appendix contains technical results on the probabilities that the optimal stopping al-
gorithm for the secretary problem selects the kth best candidate. A little bit different
proof of Theorem 4 can be found in [7]. Since [7] is a preprint written in Polish and not
available publicly, we state the full proof below.
Theorem 4. Let M∗ be the optimal stopping algorithm for the secretary problem. Fix
σ ∈ Sn. Let k ∈ [n]. The probability that M∗ selects the kth best candidate is given by
rk,n = P[CM∗(σ, τ) = σk] =
tn − 1
n
(
n−k+1∑
i=tn
(
n−k
i−1
)(
n−1
i−1
) 1
i− 1 +
1
n− 1
)
,
where tn is the threshold from Fact 1.
Proof. The following conditions have to be satisfied when M∗ returns σk. First, M∗
never stops before tn thus σk needs to be at the position greater or equal to tn in τ , say
that it is at the position i > tn (σk = τi). Next, observe that all candidates better than
σk have to appear after σk in permutation τ (call this event A, A = [{σ1, . . . , σk−1} ⊆
{τi+1, . . . , τn}]); otherwise σk will not appear as the maximal element in the induced
order. Therefore also i 6 n − k + 1. Finally, the best candidate out of {τ1, . . . , τi−1}
needs to appear before threshold tn in τ (call this event B, B = [max{τ1, . . . , τi−1} ∈
{τ1, . . . , τtn−1}]); otherwise M∗ would select this one instead of σk. The element σk
can be returned by M∗ also when it is at the last position in τ but only if σ1 appears
before time tn in τ (call this event C, C = [σ1 ∈ {τ1, . . . , τtn−1}]). Since the events A
and B are independent and (
n−i
k−1)
(n−1k−1)
=
(n−ki−1)
(n−1i−1)
, we get
rk,n = P[CM∗(σ, τ) = σk]
=
n−k+1∑
i=tn
P[A ∩B|σk = τi]P[σk = τi] + P[C|σk = τn]P[σk = τn]
=
n−k+1∑
i=tn
(
n−i
k−1
)(
n−1
k−1
) · tn − 1
i− 1 ·
1
n
+
tn − 1
n− 1 ·
1
n
=
tn − 1
n
(
n−k+1∑
i=tn
(
n−k
i−1
)(
n−1
i−1
) 1
i− 1 +
1
n− 1
)
.
Lemma 4. Let rk,n be defined as in Theorem 4. Then for k ∈ [n− 1]
rk+1,n = rk,n − tn − 1
n
· 1
k
·
(
n−tn+1
k
)(
n−1
k
) .
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Proof. Since (
n−k−1
i−2 )
(n−2i−2)
=
(n−ik−1)
(n−2k−1)
we have
rk,n − rk+1,n = tn − 1
n
n−k+1∑
i=tn
(
n−k
i−1
)− (n−k−1i−1 )(
n−1
i−1
) 1
i− 1
=
tn − 1
n
n−k+1∑
i=tn
(
n−k−1
i−2
)(
n−1
i−1
) 1
i− 1 =
tn − 1
n
n−k+1∑
i=tn
(
n−k−1
i−2
)(
n−2
i−2
) i− 1
n− 1
1
i− 1
=
tn − 1
n
1
n− 1
n−k+1∑
i=tn
(
n−i
k−1
)(
n−2
k−1
) = tn − 1
n
1
n− 1
(
n−tn+1
k
)(
n−2
k−1
) =
=
tn − 1
n
· 1
k
·
(
n−tn+1
k
)(
n−1
k
) .
Corollary 4. The sequence rk,n is non-increasing in k.
Proof. By Lemma 4 we get
rk,n − rk+1,n = tn − 1
n
· 1
k
(
n−tn+1
k
)(
n−1
k
) > 0.
Corollary 5. Let k ∈ [n]. The value rk,n can be expressed by
rk,n = r1,n − tn − 1
n
k−1∑
s=1
1
s
·
(
n−tn+1
s
)(
n−1
s
) .
Theorem 5. Let k > 1 be a constant or a function of n such that k(n) = o(n). Let rk,n
be defined as in Theorem 4. Then
rk,n ∼ 1
e
(
1−
k−1∑
s=1
1
s
(
1− 1
e
)s)
=
1
e
∞∑
s=k
1
s
(
1− 1
e
)s
.
Proof. First, note that(
n−tn+1
s
)(
n−1
s
) = (n− tn − s+ 2) . . . (n− tn)(n− tn + 1)
(n− s) . . . (n− 2)(n− 1)
=
(
1− tn − 2
n− s
)
. . .
(
1− tn − 2
n− 1
)
.
Thus (
1− tn − 2
n− s
)s
6
(
n−tn+1
s
)(
n−1
s
) 6 (1− tn − 2
n− 1
)s
.
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Recall that by Fact 1 we know that tn ∼ n/e and by Fact 2 we have r1,n ∼ 1/e. Thus
by Corollary 5
rk,n = r1,n − tn − 1
n
k−1∑
s=1
1
s
(
n−tn+1
s
)(
n−1
s
) > r1,n − tn − 1
n
k−1∑
s=1
1
s
(
1− tn − 2
n− 1
)s
∼ 1
e
− 1
e
k−1∑
s=1
1
s
(
1− 1
e
)s
=
1
e
− 1
e
( ∞∑
s=1
1
s
(
1− 1
e
)s
−
∞∑
s=k
1
s
(
1− 1
e
)s)
=
1
e
− 1
e
(
1−
∞∑
s=k
1
s
(
1− 1
e
)s)
=
1
e
∞∑
s=k
1
s
(
1− 1
e
)s
and on the other hand
rk,n 6 r1,n − tn − 1
n
k−1∑
s=1
1
s
(
1− tn − 2
n− s
)s
∼ 1
e
− 1
e
k−1∑
s=1
1
s
(
1− 1
e
)s
.
Lemma 5. Let rk,n be defined as in Theorem 4. Let k = k(n) 6 n be a function linear
in n. Then
rk,n ∼ 1
e
· 1
n
.
Proof. Recall that
rk,n =
tn − 1
n
n−k+1∑
i=tn
(
n−k
i−1
)(
n−1
i−1
) 1
i− 1 +
tn − 1
n
1
n− 1 .
Note that if k > n− tn + 1 then
n−k+1∑
i=tn
(
n−k
i−1
)(
n−1
i−1
) 1
i− 1 = 0
and by Fact 1
rk,n =
tn − 1
n
1
n− 1 ∼
1
e
· 1
n
.
Hence assume that k 6 n − tn + 1. Since tn−1n ∼ 1e and tn−1n 1n−1 ∼ 1e · 1n ,
we need to show that
∑n−k+1
i=tn
(n−ki−1)
(n−1i−1)
1
i−1 is asymptotically smaller than
1
n . Seeing that
(n−ki−1)
(n−1i−1)
=
(n−ik−1)
(n−1k−1)
and that the function f(i) = (
n−i
k−1)
(n−1k−1)
1
i−1 is decreasing in i we have
n−k+1∑
i=tn
(
n−k
i−1
)(
n−1
i−1
) 1
i− 1 =
n−k+1∑
i=tn
(
n−i
k−1
)(
n−1
k−1
) 1
i− 1 6
n− tn − k + 2
tn − 1
(
n−tn
k−1
)(
n−1
k−1
)
=
n− tn − k + 2
tn − 1
n
n− tn + 1
(
n−tn+1
k
)(
n
k
) . (7)
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Since k(n) = c · n for some constant c we get
n− tn − k + 2
tn − 1
n
n− tn + 1 ∼
e(1− c)− 1
1− 1/e
and at the same time(
n−tn+1
k
)(
n
k
) = (1− k
n− tn + 2
)
. . .
(
1− k
n
)
6
(
1− k
n
)t−1
∼ (1− c)n/e−1 = o(1/n).
Lemma 6. Let rk,n be defined as in Theorem 4. Let k ∈ [n]. Then
lim
n→∞
rk,n(
1− 1e
)k
+ 1e·n
6 1.
Proof. First, note that whenever k is a function linear in n then, by Lemma 5,
lim
n→∞
rk,n(
1− 1e
)k
+ 1e·n
= lim
n→∞
1
e·n(
1− 1e
)k
+ 1e·n
= 1
and the statement is true. Thus assume that k = o(n). Using again inequality (7) and
the fact that(
n−tn+1
k
)(
n
k
) = (1− tn − 1
n− k + 1
)
. . .
(
1− tn − 1
n
)
6
(
1− tn − 1
n
)k
we get
rk,n 6
tn − 1
n
n− tn − k + 2
tn − 1
n
n− tn + 1
(
n−tn+1
k
)(
n
k
) + tn − 1
n
1
n− 1
6 n− tn − k + 2
n− tn + 1
(
1− tn − 1
n
)k
+
tn − 1
n
1
n− 1
∼
(
1− 1
e
)k
+
1
e · n
(recall that tn ∼ n/e).
Lemma 7. Let rk,n be defined as in Theorem 4. For k ∈ [n− 2]
lim
n→∞
rk,n
rk+1,n
> lim
n→∞
rk+1,n
rk+2,n
.
Proof. First note that when k = k(n) is a function linear in n, by Lemma 5 we obtain
lim
n→∞
rk,n
rk+1,n
= lim
n→∞
rk+1,n
rk+2,n
= 1.
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Hence assume that k is either a constant or k(n) = o(n). Let ak =
∑∞
s=k
1
s
(
1− 1e
)s
.
By Theorem 4 we can write
rk,n
rk+1,n
∼ ak
ak+1
and
rk+1,n
rk+2,n
∼ ak+1
ak+2
.
Let βk = 1k
(
1− 1e
)k
. Thus we have to prove akak−βk >
ak−βk
ak−βk−βk+1 which is equiva-
lent to ak > β
2
k
βk−βk+1 . Let f(k) =
β2k
βk−βk+1 . We need to show that
∞∑
s=k
1
s
(
1− 1
e
)s
> f(k). (8)
One can easily verify that for all s > 1
1
s
(
1− 1
e
)s
> f(s)− f(s+ 1).
Summing both sides of the above inequality over s > k we obtain
∞∑
s=k
1
s
(
1− 1
e
)s
>
∞∑
s=k
(f(s)− f(s+ 1)) = f(k),
where the last equality follows from the fact that f(n) n→∞−−−−→ 0.
Theorem 6. Let l > 1 be a constant and let k ∈ {2, . . . , n− l}. Let rk,n be defined as
in Theorem 4 and let also al =
∑∞
s=l
1
s
(
1− 1e
)s
. Then
lim
n→∞
rk,n
rk+l,n
<
1
al+1
.
Proof. By Lemma 7 we have
lim
n→∞
rk+1,n
rk+l,n
= lim
n→∞
rk+1,n
rk+2,n
· lim
n→∞
rk+2,n
rk+3,n
. . . lim
n→∞
rk+l−1,n
rk+l,n
6 lim
n→∞
r2,n
r3,n
· lim
n→∞
r3,n
r4,n
. . . lim
n→∞
rl,n
rl+1,n
= lim
n→∞
r2,n
rl+1,n
.
Additionally, for k > 2, by Theorem 4 and Lemma 7
lim
n→∞
rk,n
rk+1,n
< lim
n→∞
r1,n
r2,n
.
Together, by Theorem 4, it gives
lim
n→∞
rk,n
rk+l,n
= lim
n→∞
rk,n
rk+1,n
· lim
n→∞
rk+1,n
rk+l,n
< lim
n→∞
r1,n
r2,n
lim
n→∞
r2,n
rl+1,n
= lim
n→∞
r1,n
rl+1,n
=
1
al+1
.
